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During the COVID-19 pandemic, comprehensive, accurate, and timely digital contact tracing serves as a 
decisive measure in curbing viral transmission. Such a strategy integrates corporate innovation, government 
decision-making, citizen participation, and community coordination with big data analytics. This article 
explores how key stakeholders in an open innovation ecosystem interact within the digital context to overcome 
challenges to public health and socio-economic welfare imposed by the pandemic. To enhance the digital 
contact tracing effectiveness, communities are deployed to moderate the interactions between government, 
enterprises and citizens. As an example, we study the community-based digital contact tracing in Wuhan, a 
representative case of China’s ‘virus exceptionalism’ in COVID-19 mitigation. We discuss the effectiveness 
of this strategy and raise critical ethical concerns regarding decision-making in R&D management.   
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The COVID-19 pandemic imposes enormous challenges to public health and socioeconomic 
welfare. The crisis necessitates technological and managerial innovation for business strategy, public 
administration, and government policymaking in curbing the viral spread and simultaneously main- 
taining economic activity and social life (Verma & Gustafsson, 2020). The high transmissibility, long 
incubation period, and existence of asymptomatic patients not only expose the ineffectiveness of  
traditional mitigation techniques (e.g., wearing masks, keeping physical distance, restricting long-
distance travels) but also lead to a rapid exhaustion of public health services (Nguyen et al., 2020). 
Meanwhile, due to the long duration and uncertainty in vaccine development and implementation, 
timely and accurate contact tracing is urged as a prioritized response to prevent transmission and 
spread (Kretzschmar et al., 2020, Kwok et al., 2019). Notwithstanding, timely manual contact tracing 
of infected cases and their close contacts are largely constrained by the available personnel deployed 
in the process, thus cannot sufficiently monitor human-to-human transmission once new infections 
reach a certain level.  
Composed of two criteria, completeness (the exhaustive coverage of public health data) and 
timeliness (the immediate identification and reaction to outbreaks), effective digital contact tracing 
incorporates latest information and communications technologies (ICT) to enhance tracing measures 
and coordinate communication at the societal level (Kretzschmar et al., 2020). Prior medical and 
epidemiological research mostly sees the implementation of digital contact tracing as a top-down 
government intervention (e.g. Ferretti et al., 2020, He, 2020, Kretzschmar et al., 2020, Kwok et al., 
2019, Nguyen et al., 2020, Pan et al., 2020). However, the mechanisms that facilitate the interactions 
among key stakeholders in digital contact tracing are not sufficiently addressed in prior studies. 
In this regard, we explore how the interactions among key stakeholders (enterprises, government, 
citizens, communities) in an open innovation ecosystem contribute to effective digital contact tracing. 
The open innovation ecosystem is a wide range of social forces that integrate the full spectrum of 
competitive and cooperative relationships engaged in such processes (Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014, 
Sklyar et al., 2019). More precisely, it engages multiple key stakeholders on three ‘grounds’ – the 
‘upperground’ organizations (e.g. enterprises, government), the ‘middleground’ communities (e.g. 
public collectives, associations, trade unions), and the ‘underground’ individuals (e.g. citizens) 
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(Bovaird, 2007, Cohendet et al., 2010, Grandadam et al., 2013, Gustafsson & Jarvenpaa, 2018). 
Embedded in an open innovation ecosystem, digital contact tracing embodies the big data analytics 
of public health information, which depends on four key components – pooled internal and external 
data sources generated by the individual citizens, data transformation processes facilitated by the 
enterprises, tools of data analysis and sharing platforms moderated by the communities, and data 
application outputs by the government (Raghupathi & Raghupathi, 2014). 
In this article, we explore the social conditions that facilitate the effectiveness of digital contact 
tracing based on a chronological case study of the outbreak and subsequent control measures of 
COVID-19 in Wuhan, China. As the world’s ground zero of COVID-19, China was broadly criticized 
for its initial mismanagement to control the viral spread. However, less attention has been paid to 
China’s ‘virus exceptionalism’ that introduces harsh measures (e.g. draconian lockdown of megacities, 
digital contact tracing systems, mandatory quarantine upon arrival for international travelers) to 
achieve a viral reproduction rate (R0)
1 close to zero in a short period, as well as maintain economic 
growth2 regardless of the pandemic (The Economist, April 30, 2020). The case study of Wuhan 
exhibits how digital contact tracing integrates the actions of key stakeholders and the important roles 
of middleground communities in an open innovation ecosystem. Meanwhile, we reiterate the critical 
ethical trade-offs of the community-based digital contact tracing in privacy protection, information 
transparency, and social justice concerning its effectiveness (Angst & Agarwal, 2009, Clarke & 
Margetts, 2014, Parker et al., 2020). The discourse analysis is grounded on unique ethnographic 
observations in Wuhan, and secondary sources from Chinese government press releases, international 
media coverage, seminal epidemiological publications, and embassy reports. 
 
2. Conceptual background 
2.1. Digital contact tracing and open innovation ecosystem  
The constantly evolving COVID-19 pandemic involves multidisciplinary research that 
contributes to a roadmap for business strategy and public policy (Verma & Gustafsson, 2020). Recent 
 
1 The average number of people who will catch a disease from one contagious person in a population that was previously free of 
infection and not vaccinated. A reproduction rate below 1 is the necessary condition to contain the viral spread (Braithwaite et al., 
2020). 
2 Among the world’s largest economies, China is expected to be the only one to achieve positive GDP growth (around 1.9%) in 2020 
(IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2020).  
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statistics of OECD countries show that the relationship between protecting people’s health and 
maintaining economic growth is not a ‘trade-off’ but rather goes hand-in-hand during the COVID-19 
pandemic (Hasell, 2020). Leveraging the full benefits of digital technology, a well-functioning open 
innovation system contributes to both public health and socio-economic well-being (Greve, 2015, 
Schmidthuber et al., 2019).  
Based on the big data analytics of first-hand public health information, digital contact tracing 
provides a scalable and effective solution to detect and monitor the spread of viral diseases and reduce 
the risk of human-to-human transmission (Hao et al., 2020). Furthermore, predictive analytics of 
digital contact tracing allows for the early identification of future risk scenarios and required 
countermeasures, which also allow for more targeted intervention and quarantine. As a result, the 
government can deliver timely public services to citizens according to different risk levels, while 
simultaneously supporting public health as well as economic activities. Several pilot medical research 
has confirmed the effectiveness of digital contact tracing and argue that digital solutions sharply 
contain the spread of COVID-19 by shortening the testing delay and enclosing the infection pathway3 
(Braithwaite et al., 2020, Ferretti et al., 2020, He, 2020, Kretzschmar et al., 2020). Nevertheless, 
without strong enforcement and coordination mechanisms at the societal level, only digital 
technology alone cannot sufficiently complement traditional mitigation measures for contact tracing 
effectiveness.  
We argue that the effectiveness of digital contact tracing requires proactive interactions among 
key stakeholders in an open innovation ecosystem including enterprises, government, citizens, and 
communities. First and foremost, the open innovation ecosystem entails the interaction between 
corporate innovation activity and government public administration. As the main technological 
facilitator, enterprises are urged to open up their innovation processes to absorb external knowledge 
and diffuse in-house expertise in coordinating various value-creating activities with diverse social 
players (Chesbrough et al., 2006). As the orchestrator of digital contact tracing measures, the 
government legitimizes and authorizes corporate innovation activities in sensitive areas, essentially 
the collection and analysis of citizens’ personal information, to create ‘public value’ through public-
private collaboration (Greve, 2015). Under government endorsement, enterprises develop and 
 




maintain the operations of digital contact tracing platforms as well as provide technological support 
in analytics of public health data. In this process, enterprises absorb, incubate and diffuse new 
technological and market knowledge that propels innovation activities and business model upgrading 
(Chesbrough et al., 2006, Spieth et al., 2021, Wang & Turkina, 2020). Reciprocally, by collaborating 
with the private sector, the government utilizes the outcomes of public health data analytics for real-
time decision-making and deliver public services on the digital platform. Subsequently, the 
government’s embeddedness in the open innovation networks enhances public incentives for 
innovation in areas where market incentives are insufficient (Boeing, 2016, Levén et al., 2014, Wang 
et al., 2018).  
Additionally, large-scale citizen participation plays an indispensable role that contributes to the 
timeliness and accuracy of digital contact tracing. From the perspectives of the enterprises, broad 
citizen participation via smartphone apps provides a large mass of real-time personalized data as 
strategic resources, as well as share the user’s experience and feedback to improve the product and 
service quality. From the perspectives of the government, digital contact tracing advocates the 
reconciliation of the common interests in digital-era governance (transparency on public digital 
platforms), public value management (innovation-driven strategy-making and performance 
governance), and collaborative governance (networks and collaborations in public-private partnership 
and engagement) (Greve, 2015). On the digital platforms of open innovation ecosystem, citizens 
provide personalized ‘open data’ in a consolidated format, so that the government can make timely 
decisions based on the big data analytics of ICT firms (Clarke & Margetts, 2014). Thereafter, the 
outputs of open innovation are accountable for the collective and individual interest of the public 
(Brown & Toze, 2017). On the principle of transparency, citizens can be motivated to participate in 
open innovation. New ideas and knowledge generated in citizen participation improve the 
government decision-making effectiveness and public service quality (Chun et al., 2010, 
Schmidthuber et al., 2019).  
2.2. Communities in the open innovation ecosystem 
Effective contact tracing integrates public need-oriented government administration and policy-
making, corporate technological innovation and business model upgrading, and broad engagement 
citizen participation in an open innovation ecosystem (Mulgan, 2006). The social exchanges among 
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them are often not directly performed bilaterally, but rather moderated on the intermediate interface 
of middleground communities between upperground organizations and underground individuals. 
Figure 1 presents the general framework of the interactions of the three ‘grounds’ of the open 
innovation ecosystem in the process of digital contact tracing. 
[Figure 1 here] 
The communities are collective social units of people ‘with diverse characteristics that are linked 
by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or 
settings’ (MacQueen et al., 2001). In the administrative hierarchy, the communities serve as the 
physical intermediaries that co-produce policy with the government and deliver services to the public 
(Bovaird, 2007). They represent the collective interests of affiliated citizens by creating public value, 
while autonomously moderate multi-layer interactions and knowledge transmissions (Gustafsson & 
Jarvenpaa, 2018). Existing literature suggests how different forms of communities mitigate the 
multilayer interactions in the open innovation ecosystem (e.g. Local Emergency Planning 
Committees (LEPCs) in US residential communities in alerting natural disasters and terrorist attacks 
(McEntire David & Myers, 2004), Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in innovation project 
leaders selection and networking of engineers working groups (Fleming & Waguespack, 2007), and 
the video game community building in the creative city of Montréal (Grandadam et al., 2013)). In 
these examples, the community formation is led by the upperground organizations based on 
geographically and relational proximity and/or professional connections. By generating and 
leveraging the influence of communities on the digital platform, policymakers mobilize the collective 
intelligence and engagement of autonomous individuals to achieve the strategic goals in open 
innovation.       
In digital contact tracing, the communities aggregate and transfer the first-hand individual health 
data to the analytical functions of endorsed ICT firms, which later on present the consolidated 
outcomes to the government policymakers (Eckman et al., 2007). In return, the communities receive 
policy mandates and guidelines on the same platform from the government, who then defuse the 
content to affiliated members, including alert of the outbreak in the community, testing guidelines at 
community health centers, as well as the instructions of neighborhoods and daily necessities delivery 
services. When an epidemic breaks out, communities are both the first responders to citizens’ requests 
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at the organizational level  as well as the implementing agency of governmental commands at the 
public administration baselines (McEntire David & Myers, 2004). The citizens receive pertinent and 
practical information from their affiliated communities via the digital platform. Reversely, the 
increasing willingness of the citizens to participate in contact tracing enhances the effectiveness of 
digitized public administration (Angst & Agarwal, 2009, Schmidthuber et al., 2019).  
2.3 Ethical concerns of digital contact tracing  
Regardless of the necessity of containing the viral spread, digital contact tracing equivalently 
raises crucial ethical concerns for its purposes and means. The actual value of personal data lies in its 
contextualization with data points of the population. Successful big data analytics of digital contact 
tracing requires a large quantity of well-processed and pooled data as well as responsive feedback 
that meet participants’ needs based on the trust of the public administration's credibility (Raghupathi 
& Raghupathi, 2014). However, digital technology will reach maximum effectiveness only if the 
near-population uses the same app and is willing (or obliged) to share the generated data (Clarke & 
Margetts, 2014). Stating ‘the mere existence of an emergency does not in itself legitimize any 
intrusion on the autonomy or privacy of individuals or group’, Parker et al. (2020) reviewed several 
crucial ethical issues in the implementation of digital contact tracing, including privacy protection, 
freedom of choice, the responsibilities of institutions and professionals as well as social justice and 
fairness. In the short- to medium run, risks may include the misuse of data and technology or 
prolonged surveillance without consensus among citizens. In times of acute emergencies, there may 
be a larger collective willingness to compromise privacy for gains in security. However, in the long 
run, government and tech giants can monopolize the usage of public data collected in contact tracing 
as a ‘new normal’, which may infringe citizens’ right of choice and discretion even after the pandemic.   
In this ethical dilemma, the community plays the intermediary role of leveraging the voices and 
power between underground individuals and upperground organizations. The benign interactions 
between the citizens and the government are grounded on public trust and confidence, which 
necessitate transparency and accountability from public administration (Clarke & Margetts, 2014). If 
the underground individuals are unwilling to provide their data to the upperground organizations, or 
the latter have the insufficient capability for real-time data aggregation and analytics, which would 
adversely affect all stakeholders. Thereafter, the communities are designated to monitor the 
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upperground organizations not only to ‘do things well’, but also ‘do things right’ – representing social 
justice and in public service co-production and the common interest of the affiliated citizens. 
   
3. Community-based digital contact tracing in Wuhan 
To illustrate how effective digital contact tracing engages key stakeholders in containing COVID-
19, we interpret a chronological case study of the digital contact tracing applied in Wuhan, China 
over three stages (see Figure 2). The evidence combines unique ethnographic observations by one of 
the authors in Wuhan from mid-January to early June 2020 with secondary sources4 of press releases 
from the Chinese government, international media coverage, seminal epidemiological publications, 
and nonpublic status reports by the German Embassy and Consulates in China5. 
[Figure 2 here] 
3.1 Phase I: The emergence of COVID-19 in Wuhan 
It is widely acknowledged that in December 2019 the first known COVID-19 patient was 
identified in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei Province and a major transportation hub in central China 
(Huang et al., 2020). Before January 20206, the local authorities of Wuhan claimed no evidence of a 
human-to-human transmission phenomenon nor infections among medical staff. The public was 
provided little information on local infection risks or necessary preventive measures to take after 
spotting infection symptoms. Residents were still allowed to circulate within or depart from the city 
for the Lunar New Year holiday. Consequently, the infections not only increased locally but also 
expanded across the country and abroad (Chen & Yu, 2020). However, on January 20, a public health 
expert team dispatched from the central government of China to Wuhan fully overturned prior 
conclusions by the local authorities on low human-to-human transmission and also confirmed 
infections in hospitals. On January 23, the municipal government of Wuhan launched a draconian 
lockdown that suspended all local and external transportation connections as well as closed down 
almost all nonessential businesses.  
 
4 The Online Appendix lists non-scientific secondary sources accessed in the study. 
5 The status reports are originally provided to the German Federal Foreign Office and cover the time period January 22 to March 20 
2020. Upon journalist request and in accordance with the German Freedom of Information Act, such reports were publicly disclosed 
on November 9 and subsequently obtained by the authors. 
6 Unless specified, all dates mentioned hereafter are designated to year 2020. 
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To reduce the viral spread in public, the municipal government of Wuhan banned all unauthorized 
public and private transportation and urged residents to avoid unnecessary transfers in and out of the 
city. However, due to lacking location-specific information on infections and coordinated crisis 
management, the scale of infections still escalated sharply (see Figure 3). Although some early 
interventions were undertaken, the infection rates still surged rapidly due to the shortage of personal 
protective equipment (PPE), the negligence of family-based infection clusters, and delayed diagnosis 
and treat- ment (Pan et al., 2020). Because of numerous incoming patients, local healthcare resources 
and staff were immediately exhausted. Throughout this early mismanagement, the local authorities 
of Wuhan did not sufficiently pay attention to the potential of digital technology in providing 
authoritative and transparent public health information as well as mobilizing grassroot social forces 
in mitigating the viral spread. The public went through mass panic-like uncertainty and searched for 
information from unauthorized social media sources, which further deteriorated the credibility of 
government decision-making. The low effectiveness in curbing the viral spread and the increasing 
public dissatisfaction with the local government led to the replacement of local leadership boards of 
Hubei Province and Wuhan Municipality by the Chinese central government on February 13.   
[Figure 3 here] 
3.2 Phase II: Community-based digital contact tracing during the lockdown 
To overturn the disastrous situation in Phase I, the new leadership board of Wuhan swiftly 
introduced the ‘closed-end community management’ strategy including a community-based digital 
contract tracing mission in mid-February. During the lockdown period, physical barriers were settled 
at the borders of residential neighborhoods to minimize physical movement. At the same time, 
residents were divided into community grids based on these boundaries as the basic unit of digital 
contact tracing.  
The community-based digital contact tracing combined the digital technological development 
with the social interactions in an open innovation ecosystem in community administration. Endorsed 
by the government, ICT firms firstly developed contact tracing apps implanted on ubiquitously used 
communication and online payment digital platforms, such WeChat (Tencent) and Alipay (Alibaba)7, 
to enable the big data analysis. In Wuhan, two contact tracing apps were introduced at the municipal 
 
7 As of March 2020, WeChat has 983.18 million active users and Alipay has 698.56 million active users in China.  
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and provincial level (see Table 1), namely, Wuhan Zhanyi on the WeChat platform and Ehuiban-
Hubei Health QR Code on the Alipay platform (see Table 1). On both apps, individual users were 
requested to provide personal information (e.g. ID number, demographic information, verified 
cellphone number, domicile address, family member information), health conditions (body 
temperature, possible infection symptoms, contact with diagnosed or suspected patients), and travel 
history before the lockdown. Then the digital contact tracing app automatically generated a health 
QR code as the digital ID and assign a community grid for monitoring.   
[Table 1 here] 
Meanwhile, civil servants and volunteers were dispatched as contact tracers (or grid 
correspondents) in the community grids to get in contact with residents. Their main tasks included 
conducting door-to-door surveys on household health conditions, providing information on public 
services, coordinating daily essential goods supplies, and contacting emergency service once local 
infections are identified. At the physical entrance of the closed-end communities, contact tracers were 
stationed to check the ID information and health condition by scanning their health QR codes 
presented on the tracing apps. Since downloading the contact tracing app and generating personalized 
health QR codes were the prerequisites of physical mobility outside the closed-end community, these 
monitoring measures ensured the broad user coverage of contact tracing apps downloads at the 
individual level. Moreover, the community contact tracers also facilitated the medical services on the 
digital platform during the lockdown period. Since all public and private transportation means were 
banned, people with COVID-19 symptoms could only arrange transportation to the next available 
hospital vacancies or quarantine centers by contacting the contact tracers. While coordinating patient 
transportation, the community contact tracers further aggregated the local outbreak information in the 
big data analytics system. The government and supporting ICT firms compared aggregated 
community-level information with administrative databases to estimate the risk of infection within 
local communities, and then identify closed contacts of diagnosed cases for quarantine. Based on the 
real-time contact tracing data, the municipal government could effectively track potential viral 
spreading paths. Moreover, the government could assess community-level spreading risk and adopt 
differentiated measures to lift the lockdown. The more complete and accurate digital contact tracing 
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with differentiated lockdown measures contributed to the sharp drop in new infections and an increase 
in hospital discharge, which laid down the evidential ground for lifting the lockdown.  
3.3 Phase III: Evolving contact tracing measures after the lockdown 
After 76 days of draconian lockdown, on April 8, the municipal government lifted physical 
restrictions. Meanwhile, many digitalized contact tracing measures are still maintained to prevent a 
‘second wave’ and the mission of community-based digital contact tracing is shifted from detection 
towards prevention. 
First and foremost, the digital health QR code turned into colored electronic permission for 
individuals to return to work and travel. Based on the tracing data of local infections collected during 
the lockdown period, the government and ICT firms divided all local community grids into three risk 
levels – high, medium, low on a dynamic basis. On the ground of these three tiers, residents were 
assigned colored health QR codes on the contact tracing app terminals based on the risk of community 
infection. Firstly, the diagnosed and suspected infecting patients together with their close contacts 
were assigned ‘red codes’, which required 14-day quarantine at home or the quarantine centers. The 
residents in the same community grid of the red code assignees would be assigned ‘yellow codes’ for 
a 7-day quarantine at home. The prior mobility tracks of red and yellow code holders would be 
immediately reported to the local health authorities and released to the public on the digital platforms. 
Based on the big data analytics of red and yellow code holder clusters, the municipal government 
publicly announced the list of high or medium risk communities and deployed dynamic ‘closed-end 
management’ within these communities accordingly. Otherwise, a community grid would be 
announced as a ‘non-infection community’, if no red code or yellow code holders were detected for 
14 consecutive days. The affiliated members were assigned ‘green codes’, which allowed full access 
to public places and transportation as well as the permission to return to work. To ensure the 
effectiveness of this dynamic controlling measure, the contact tracers checked the health QR code 
colors and registered the body temperature of passersby at the entrance of residential areas, public 
places, or public transportation. These measures ensure tight monitoring of human mobility and 
timely identification of close contacts in public places once a positive case is diagnosed.  
To further eradicate threats of a ‘second wave’, on May 12 the municipal government of Wuhan 
launched an ambitious plan of conducting universal nucleic tests of all residents. Once again, the 
communities were deployed as the intermediary communication and coordination channel between 
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the government and the citizens. The municipal government established temporary testing centers in 
the public places of residential neighborhoods. Trained medical professionals were dispatched to 
these centers to conduct swab and/or blood tests. The contact tracers continuously utilized the contact 
tracing apps to inform residents about assigned time slots and test locations. When entering the testing 
centers, residents were requested to scan their health QR codes and radio-frequency identification 
(RFID) ID cards to generate a personalized barcode tagging on the testing samples of each participant. 
Since the personal information was already consolidated during the health QR code registration, the 
registration procedure was largely simplified, so that the residents could immediately take the test 
and leave the center with minimum human contact. Via the contact tracing apps, residents with limited 
mobility, and those who missed the grouped testing could also request individualized testing at home. 
Within one week, the residents automatically received their nucleic testing results on the contact 
tracing apps to determine if they were permitted to return to work.  
On June 2, the provincial government of Hubei announced that from May 14 to June 1, the 
universal nucleic tests covered 9,899,828 residents. In total 300 asymptotic cases were identified, and 
1,174 close contacts were traced and underwent quarantine. After that date, no local infections have 
been reported and the city of Wuhan reintroduced no lockdown measures till the end of 2020. 
 
4. Case interpretation 
4.1 Effectiveness of big data analytics 
The practice of community-based digital contact tracing in Wuhan appears to demonstrate how 
digital technology engages multiple key stakeholders in an open innovation ecosystem in crisis. As 
the world’s first megacity hit by COVID-19, Wuhan witnessed a disastrous initial stage of 
mismanagement. Initial disregard for digital technology and community engagement resulted in the 
rapid exhaustion of public health resources and panic among citizens. Later on, the engagement of 
key stakeholders, specifically the middleground communities, in an open innovation ecosystem not 
only increases the completeness and timeliness of digital contact tracing to curb the viral spread but 
also contribute to the re-establishment of social and economic life. 
In the upperground, the government’s endorsement and collaboration with private firms such as 
Tencent and Alibaba was an important foundation for rapid public-private collaboration. 
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Technologically supported by ICT firms, the municipal government became capable of conducting 
big data analytics that aggregated citizens’ health and geolocation information via the contact tracing 
platform. Thereafter, the government could undertake timely intervention measures and provide 
urgently required public services. In turn, the ICT firms that successfully bid the right to develop 
contact tracing apps and platforms gained legitimacy in crisis management and extended their base 
of public or private customers.  
In the middleground, the communities co-produced public services and coordinated 
communication with individuals on the digital platform. On the one hand, the communities 
aggregated real-time data clusters for more complete and accurate big data analytics at the 
upperground. On the other hand, by implementing the monitoring measures and providing 
personalized services, the communities ensured the broad underground citizen participation in the 
digital contact tracing and intervened in cluster infections together with upperground organizations. 
Finally, the communities served as the social force to ensure the smooth transition in lifting the 
lockdown including controlling health QR codes for returning workers and coordinating universal 
nucleic tests. 
In the underground, the essential contact tracing systems were built on ubitiously used digital 
platforms, i.e. WeChat and Alipay, so that the citizens encountered little operational hurdles to get 
adapted to the system. Individual users constantly provide first-hand public health and geospatial data 
through contact tracing apps installed on their smartphones. In return, they received timely analytical 
results of the detected community transmission as well as the public service. Thanks to the broad 
coverage in the underground and timely reacted contact tracing forwarded by the middleground 
communities and digital platform, the upperground organizations could improve the accuracy of big 
data analytics of public health information, and then implement differentiated preventive measures 
on communities of different risk levels.  
In all, the community-based digital contact tracing in Wuhan combines the digital technological 
advances and the mobilization of multiple social forces embedded in the open innovation system. 
Regardless of the initial mismanagement, Wuhan established a digital contact tracing system that 
operates at significantly lower socio-economic costs than what repeated lockdowns may incur, at the 
same time, provides safeguard for the citizens to return to work. Reconstructing the full transmission 
dynamics of COVID-19 in Wuhan, Hao et al. (2020) estimate that the early-stage R0 of 3.54 has 
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decreased to 0.28 as of March 8 corresponding to a reduction in total infections by 96%, shortly after 
the introduction of community-based digital contact tracing. The eventually successful experience in 
Wuhan is broadly applied in many other Chinese cities that encountered the threat of a ‘second wave’. 
In China, several megacities underwent a similar process of community-based digital contact tracing 
after the detection of local outbreaks including Harbin (April), Beijing (June), Dalian (July), Ürümqi 
(August), and Qingdao (October), and Shenyang (December). In sum, the exploratory model of 
community-based digital contact tracing has reached national adaptability and provides policymakers 
and ICT enterprises with a practical reference.  
4.2 Ethical decision-making 
While the case of Wuhan largely emphasizes the effectiveness of community-based digital 
contact tracing in curbing the spread of the virus as the priority, numerous crucial ethical issues are 
not yet sufficiently addressed in practice. First of all, the big data analytics of public health 
information at the social level raise enormous concerns on users’ informed consent, privacy, 
anonymization, data ownership, and right of access to data (Mittelstadt & Floridi, 2016). The lack of 
a reliable regulatory backbone on public data collection and analytics also weakens the legitimacy 
and credibility of the contact tracing measures introduced by the local governments. The digital 
platform governance in China is largely dependent on the self-regulation of internet users under the 
guidance and trust-building of the government (Weber & Jia, 2007). However, the Chinese authorities 
are broadly criticized for the actual misuse of sensitive personal data considering its strong data 
collection capability and ambiguous personal information standards (Greenleaf & Livingston, 2017). 
The terms of service of Wuhan’s contact tracing apps explicitly state that data encryption and masking 
processing are applied to protect users’ personal information. However, such general statements still 
cannot completely ease the privacy concerns of users without more transparent clarification. 
Individuals in the underground can hardly request the ICT firms or the government to disclose how 
sensitive personal data collected during digital contact tracing are stored and proceeded after the 
pandemic (Kelion, 2020).  
Second, digitized public administration demands on the resolution of privacy concerns to 
enhance the willingness of citizen participation (Angst & Agarwal, 2009). Nonetheless, constrained 
by the information asymmetry in an ecosystem dominated by the government and enterprises, the 
general public’s willingness to provide information and the ‘right to know’ is often ignored or 
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undermined by policymakers and enterprises (Dawson et al., 2010). In China, individual participation 
in digital contact tracing is mostly based on enforced obligation rather than voluntary motivation. For 
example, the contact tracers have the right to refuse individuals without valid health QR codes 
exhibited on the contact tracing apps to enter the community or public places and offices. In other 
words, the individuals have little freedom of choice even if they are not willing to participate in digital 
contact tracing.  
Third, the community-based digital contact tracing applied in Wuhan mostly emphasizes the 
effectiveness of bottom-up data collection and analysis from the underground citizens, while the top-
down feedback and direction from the upperground organizations largely depend on the goodwill of 
the government. Local communities are regarded more as a grassroots unit of public administration 
mandated by the municipal government, rather than spontaneously formed autonomous collectives of 
residents. Whether the voice of the underground individual can be heard and transferred toward the 
upperground via the middleground community mechanisms remains unclear in China. Without 
accountable legislation and transparent monitoring by the middleground communities, upperground 
government and tech giants monopolize the use of public data with little collective social forces to 
advocate the rights of the weaker side of the underground individuals. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, we study how community-based digital contact tracing contributes to curbing the 
spread of COVID-19. The community-based digital contact tracing incorporates enterprise innovation, 
citizen participation, and government decision-making in the open innovation ecosystem and, in turn, 
contributes to the completeness and timeliness of big data analytics to contain the viral spread (Chun 
et al., 2010, Greve, 2015, Kretzschmar et al., 2020). As part of digital solutions to curb viral 
transmission, the digital contact tracing system developed by ICT firms provides real-time public 
health information recording the geospatial data of diagnosed or suspected infections (Kamel Boulos 
& Geraghty, 2020). Compared to traditional manual contact tracing constrained by available human 
resources, scalable digital resources ‘would be sufficient to stop the epidemic if used by enough 
people, in particular when combined with other measures such as physical distancing’ (Ferretti et al., 
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2020). By targeting only those citizens at risk, epidemics could be contained without the need for 
mass quarantines (‘lockdowns’) that are harmful to society in numerous ways. 
In addition to the technological inputs of enterprises, the effectiveness of such a digital solution 
also requires the synergy of governmental enforcement and guidelines as well as active citizen 
participation. The effectiveness of digital contact tracing depends on broad bottom-up social 
engagement and the timely top-down intervention, whereas context-dependent social, technological, 
and political factors, including compliance with regulations, may moderate the outcomes (Braithwaite 
et al., 2020). Under the legal endorsement of the government and technological support of ICT firms, 
the digital contact tracing systems orchestrate the synergy of key stakeholders in an open innovation 
ecosystem. In this progress, local communities play the pivotal role of the middleground that 
stimulates the underground citizen participation and facilitates the upperground organizational 
decision making (Cohendet et al., 2010). Facilitated by the innovation outputs by the enterprises, 
communities are enabled to co-produce policy with the government and deliver services to the public 
(Bovaird, 2007). As a result, the digital solutions ease the pressure on healthcare and public 
administrative systems, while maintaining a higher socioeconomic equilibrium (Ting et al., 2020). 
As evidence, we explore the application of community-based digital contact tracing in Wuhan as 
the prominent example of China’s ‘virus exceptionalism’. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 
pandemic, around 50 countries have launched government-backed contact tracing apps: 80% are 
Bluetooth-based and 90% function voluntarily (O'Neill et al., 2020). However, without government 
enforcement and community coordination, many of these Bluetooth-based apps cannot reach 
sufficiently broad coverage of citizens or construct effective contact tracing systems for big data 
analytics based on geographic location and social relationships. The example of Wuhan illustrates 
how big data analytics on digital platforms are accelerated by broad social engagement and, in turn, 
contribute to re-establishing socio-economic order (Hao et al., 2020). Although China’s ‘virus 
exceptionalism’ may not be duplicable in most other countries, the general and China-specific 
epidemiological evidence is confirmative of the positive influence of digital contact tracing in curbing 
the viral spread and complements the implications derived from the case study of Wuhan, which has 
strong theoretical and practical implications for further research (Ferretti et al., 2020, Hao et al., 2020, 
Kretzschmar et al., 2020). Meanwhile, we underline critical ethical concerns related to the protection 
of individual privacy, the transparency of public consent, and the accountability of public interest. 
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The means of digitalization itself cannot fully solve all the aforementioned problems alone. The 
enforcement of privacy law, the improvement of transparency of public decision-making, and the 
trust-building of the government are all at stake for countries that implement community-based digital 
contact tracing measures. The open exchange of best practices and experiences will be conducive to 
develop the most suitable albeit potentially diverse solutions based on political, social, technological, 
and economic idiosyncrasies.  
We acknowledge several limitations of our research. Although the pragmatic research approach 
contributes new and timely insights on the factual details of the case of Wuhan, more rigorous 
positivist research is needed to better understand the causal effect between the community 
engagement in digital contact tracing and viral spread control effectiveness. Due to the still evolving 
situation of COVID-19 in China and elsewhere, the eventual effectiveness of community-based 
contact tracing requires a comprehensive empirical assessment after the pandemic. Finally, we call 
for future research on how policymakers may balance the technological effectiveness, public 
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Figure 2: COVID-19 daily cumulative diagnosed, recovered and deceased cases and remaining hospitalization in Wuhan 
 
Source: National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China, Health Commission of Hubei Province 
*Note: On April 17 2020 the Health Commission of Wuhan announced an adjustment of increase in diagnosed and deceased cases, including the unreported cases at the early 
phase of the epidemic to the limited testing and accommodation capacity then. (Source: Notification of Wuhan COVID-19 epidemic prevention and control headquarter on the 
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Figure 3: National, provincial and municipal daily increase in COVID-19 diagnosed infections 
 
 







































































































































































































































































































Table 1: Community-based contact tracing apps in Wuhan 
Contact tracing App Wuhan Zhangyi (武汉战疫) Ehuiban-Hubei Health QR Code (鄂汇办-湖北健康码) 
Icon 
  
Authorization Wuhan Government Service and Big Data 
Administration Bureau 
Hubei Provincial Government Transparency and Services 
Administration Office 
Date of Introduction February 9, 2020 February 29, 2020 
Administrative Level Municipality Province 
Digital Platform  
(Number of active users in 
China, March 2020) 
Wechat 
(983.18 million)   
Alipay  
(698.56 million) 
Supporting ICT firm  
(Annual Revenue in 2019) 
Tencent Holdings Ltd.  
(52.82 billion USD) 
Alibaba Group  
(52.76 billion USD) 
Main Functions Acquire electronic permission to enter residential 
neighbourhoods and public places in the city of 
Wuhan. Consult information on real-time epidemic 
statistics, hospital vacancies in the municipality, and 
volume of nearby population flows. 
Acquire electronic permission to travel and work within 
the territory of Hubei Province. Report information on 
possible infections in the province. Consult information 
on hospital vacancies in the province, and policy on 
epidemic prevention and control. 
Source: Wuhan Government Service and Big Data Administration Bureau; Hubei Provincial Government Transparency and Services Administration Office; Statista 2020.
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